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Abstract
The article focuses on the view of the Mediterranean in early geopolitical writings.
Through this lens, it looks at the spacemetaphors and imaginative geographies that deﬁned
the core meanings of the Middle Sea over the last 200 years. The author discusses the role
that the Enlightenment philosophy of history had in the shaping of classical geography.
Moving on similar grounds, early geopolitical writers believed in the ‘force of history’ as a
generator of spatial order. They used episodes of the Mediterranean past as a parable for
the spatial articulation of contact, conﬂict and power in the overall ‘process of civilization’.
In their writings recurs an idea, which resonates also in later key texts regarding the same
maritime space. It is the idea of a ‘greater Mediterranean’ that after the ﬁfteenth century
was destined to gain worldwide importance thanks to transoceanic expansion. In doing so,
geographers, historians and philosophers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
transformed the Middle Sea into a metaphor for the universal mission of Europe and the
West.
The Mediterranean policies put forward for almost half a centuryby the European Union and its predecessor institutions havecontinued to go back and forth between inclusive and exclusive
versions.1 Overall, the Global Mediterranean Policy, the Barcelona
Process, the Union for the Mediterranean, Medgovernance, and other
attempts, oscillated between ‘developmental policy’ approaches, security
policies for the protection against tensions in the area, and renewed
rhetoric underpinnings of alleged commonalities, in order to create a
common space for markets and mobility. In 2007, Mohieddine Hadri
from Tunis University was conﬁdent that ‘the South and the North
Mediterranean, more than ever before, are conﬂuent in terms of identity,
culture and economy’.2 This was before the ‘Arab Spring’, the western
military intervention in Libya, the Syrian war, the intensifying of mass
migration, and the further spread of terrorism occurred, and provoked
1 The present research is part of the ‘Spaces of Expectation’ Project funded by Swedish
O¨stersjo¨stiftelsen. Based at So¨derto¨rn University Stockholm, the project is run in cooperation with
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. I thank O¨stersjo¨stiftelsen and the project partners for their support.
2 Mohieddine Hadri, ‘A conﬂuence area to prosper’, The Bridge: A Quarterly Review on European
Integration, 6/3 (2007), pp. 63–5, at p. 65.
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other changes in the approach. According to the opportunities and
necessities of the day, European powers seem to reinforce or attenuate
their discourses on Mediterranean unity. What hardly changes is the
asymmetrical relationship between assistants and assisted, teachers and
pupils, protectors and prote´ge´es, that the EU headquarters postulate,
apparently imagining Europe always in the role of the former, North
Africa and the Middle East in the role of the latter. However exclusive
or inclusive, their perception of Mediterranean unity seems not to foresee
a symmetric number of ‘commonalities’ that would require European
countries to adapt to so-called ‘backward’ standards.
My hypothesis is that the bias in the representation of the region
belongs to a long tradition. Nor was the political evocation of
Mediterranean unity new in the late twentieth century. During the ‘long’
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries’ national and imperialist
struggles, rhetorical references to Greek–Latin civilization and classical
philosophy, as well as Christianity, already supported both intra-
Mediterranean solidarity in the effort to smash ‘anachronistic’ empires
and helping the birth of new nation-states,3 and the later conﬂicts among
nationalist interests, of which these states were an expression.
Over the last twenty years, many historians have scrutinized the uses
of the Mediterranean discourse. A conspicuous number of space- and
time-related variants have emerged from their analyses.4 My intention
is certainly not to deny either the importance of variety or the effort
to contextualize and differentiate regarding each of these different
imaginings. The reasons why, for example, the German imagination of
Mediterranean-ness remained focused on Greek antiquity, the Italian on
the Roman empire, while the French was more multifaceted, have to do
with the speciﬁc contexts in which these national views developed. Similar
variants in the view of the Mediterranean past were also markers for
competing national ambitions in the then present. However, people can
also ﬁght each other using the same type of weapon.We should historicize,
so to say, not only the ﬁghting, but also the armaments technology. After
all, the competing actors agreed that the Mediterranean is a unique,
somehow unitary and ‘historically meaningful’ partition of the earth’s
surface, even if they adapted these assumptions to their own speciﬁc
beliefs and interests. The purpose of this article is not to allow, for once,
the variants and contingencies to obstruct our view of the long-term
conceptual core constituents of ‘the Mediterranean’.
A decade ago, twomajor specialists inMediterranean studies, Peregrine
Horden and Nicholas Purcell, noticed that we ‘have no comprehensive
3 Maurizio Isabella, Konstantina Zanou (eds), Mediterranean Diasporas: Politics and Ideas in the
Long Nineteenth Century (London, 2015); Gilles Pe´cout, ‘Philhellenism as a Political Friendship:
Italian volunteers in XIXth centuryMediterranean’, Journal ofModern Italian Studies, 9/4 (2004), pp.
405–27.
4 See the chapters in Thierry Fabre and Robert Ilbert (eds), Les Repre´sentations de la Me´diterrane´e
(Paris, 2000) and issues 16/2 (2001), 17/1, 17/2 (2002) and 18/1 (2003) of theMediterranean Historical
Review.
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historical and ethnographic study of “the idea of the Mediterranean” ’.5
As a humble contribution to a discussion that may lead to the removal of
this lacuna, in the following pages, I will focus on the Mediterranean as
a metaphorical blueprint for modern geopolitics. What interests me here
is the longue dure´e of imaginings of the Mediterranean that emerge from
early geopolitical writings, and from the comparison of thesewritingswith
later scholarly and political efforts to make sense of this region. I shall
develop my argument loosely borrowing from the methods of conceptual
history and proﬁting from geographers’ critical reﬂections regarding the
earlier scientiﬁc statute of their own discipline.
The ﬁrst section reﬂects on spatial metaphors and argues in favour of
the concentration of my analysis on those discursive elements regarding
the Mediterranean that have seemingly remained unchanging over the
last 200 years. The second section offers a synthetic overview of the
tides of geopolitical and historical reﬂections on the Mediterranean.
The following sections will scrutinize the core dimensions of the
Mediterraneanmetaphor by considering theway early geopolitical writers
related to sea and power, how they conceived of the maritime space as a
space of contact and contrast, andwhy they believed in the force of history
as a generator of spatial order. Finally, I will discuss their idea, according
towhich a ‘greaterMediterranean’ has emerged since the ﬁfteenth century,
as a metaphor of the universal mission of Europe, of ‘civilization’ and
‘modernity’. I will conclude by underlining the role of western philosophy
of history in deﬁning a certain place in history as ‘the Mediterranean’.
I
The Greek word μεταϕορα´ refers to physical transport, for example,
of people and goods by ship, but also to the transfer of signiﬁcance.
From both points of view, the Mediterranean can be considered a perfect
metaphor, as it is ‘a place of lively communication, trade and seafaring,
but it also carries a strong ﬁgurative power, embodying a multitude of
ideologies and imaginings’.6 What interests us in the present context is
the transport of meaning.
From the perspective of cognitive linguistics, ‘metaphor can be brieﬂy
deﬁned as thinking of one thing (A) as though it were another thing
(B)’. Goatly goes on to explain that in the conventional terminology of
his discipline, ‘A is the Topic or Target and B is the Vehicle or Source’.7
Take a physical portion of space, for example, a water mass and the
5 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, ‘The Mediterranean and “the new thalassology” ’,
American Historical Review, 111 (2006), pp. 722–80, at p. 729.
6 Rolf Petri and Anastasia Stouraiti, ‘Raummetaphern der Ru¨cksta¨ndigkeit: Die Levante und der
Mezzogiorno in italienischen Identita¨tsdiskursen der Neuzeit’, in Frithjof Benjamin Schenk and
Martina Winkler (eds), Der Su¨den: Neue Perspektiven auf eine europa¨ische Geschichtsregion (Frank-
furt am Main, 2007), pp. 151–74, at p. 152.
7 Andrew Goatly,Washing the Brain: Metaphor and Hidden Ideology (Amsterdam and Philadelphia,
2007), p. 11.
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surrounding lands that develop, roughly, from 30 to 47 degrees north,
and from 5 degrees west to 40 degrees east, and make of it a vehicle
for philosophical targets such as ‘civilization’ and ‘history’. This is what
happens when one elaborates a myriad of physical and written data,
and transforms them into the sources for a target concept. According
to my hypothesis, something similar has occurred to the geographical
partition, called Middle Sea or Mediterranean since ancient times when,
at a certain point of modern history, it became a metaphorical vehicle of
philosophical concepts, such as ‘civilization’. Braudel’s oeuvre is the most
prominent example of this operation, but it is neither the only nor the ﬁrst
of its kind.8
Metaphorical speech is a recurrent element in the construction of
conceptual systems. Consequently, all writing on history will comprise
metaphorical elements. I myself used the metaphor of ﬁghting and
weaponry above to target a difference between rapid and slow changes.
However, not all targets involve the same degree of abstraction
that distinguishes a concept such as ‘civilization’, let alone ‘history’.
As Ko¨vecses points out, target domains ‘are abstract, diffuse, and
lack clear delineation; as a result, they “cry out” for metaphorical
conceptualization’.9 Given the level of abstraction of ‘civilization’ and
‘history’, one may argue that they call particularly loudly. They situate the
Mediterranean in the case group of ‘imaginative geographies’ described
by postcolonial theory, in particular by the seminal work of Edward
Said.10 According to Derek Gregory’s comment, ‘geography is about
more than the will-to-power disguised as the will-to-map’. It is also
part of the generalized practices of ‘construction of identity through the
poetics of space’, which are more complex cultural practices than a crude
top-down exercise of power would be, even if they remain ‘inseparable
from determinate modalities of power’.11 This is where metaphors step
in: borders, regions, maritime spaces and similar categories constitute
a socio-cultural phenomenon ‘that transports symbolic attributions of
meaning through material media, creating a nexus between physis and the
social making of sense’.12
Certainly, ‘the Mediterranean’ stands for more than ‘civilization’ or
‘history’ tout court. Rather, it represents a more complex metaphor
system13 formed by a number of single metaphors, among which we
ﬁnd allegories and parables. ‘The Mediterranean’ is a metaphor for
‘civilization’ in so far as this very idea constitutes the imaginary backbone
8 Fernand Braudel, La Me´diterrane´e et le monde me´diterrane´en a` l’e´poque de Philippe II [1949] (2nd
edn; Paris, 1966).
9 Zolta´n Ko¨vecses,Metaphor: A Practical Introduction (2nd edn; Oxford, 2010), p. 23.
10 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978).
11 DerekGregory, ‘Imaginative geographies’,Progress in Human Geography, 19/4 (1995), pp. 447–85,
at pp. 448, 456.
12 Marc Redepenning, Wozu Raum? Systemtheorie, critical geopolitics und raumbezogene
Semantiken (Leipzig, 2006), p. 27.
13 Ko¨vecses,Metaphor, pp. 149–52.
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of regional unity as such. At the same time, it is an exemplary place
where the story of an encounter with an older civilization is situated,
which then gives rise to a new, ‘higher’ and more conscious one. This is
not just one chapter in a bigger ‘world history’ narrative, which elects
the Mediterranean as the central stage of a crucial period. It is also
a parable, meant to teach us that civilization is a process, and that
a transcendent meaning of history gives that process a direction and
makes sense of it. Not only this; according to the narrative it was,
again, in ‘the Mediterranean’ where for the ﬁrst time people discovered
that the purpose of history can be understood. Finally, the ‘greater
Mediterranean’ is a metaphor for the universal mission of Europe and
its ‘passage to the West’,14 which both manifested themselves through
maritime and colonial expansion. These are, inmy view, the coremeanings
of the Mediterranean metaphor over the last two centuries. Borutta
and Lemmes consider Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt of 1798–1801 as
the starting point of the invention of the Mediterranean as a region
situated in a colonial context.15 As Gregory comments, before the French
army engaged the Mamelukes at the battle of the pyramids, Napoleon
‘dismissed his immediate entourage with the instruction to “ . . . think that
from the heights of these monuments, forty centuries are watching us” ’.16
Napoleon, who evokes ‘history’ to sanctify his action, is an excellent
mouthpiece of the Mediterranean metaphor in the making to which I am
referring in this article.
As already mentioned, Mediterranean imaginings serve different
political purposes, especially to deliver historical legitimization to a
wide range of space-related national and imperialist power projects.
An even greater multiplicity possibly holds for local and sub-regional
situations. Claudio Fogu is therefore right when observing that ‘the ﬂow of
metaphors around the theme ofMediterranean-ness is virtually inﬁnite’.17
I maintain, nevertheless, that the general western narrative on history,
which assigns to this sea and its rims a central supporting function,
confers on the metaphors, which have circulated since the eighteenth
century up until the present, a common paradigmatic structure, evenwhen
they are part of competing narratives and serve conﬂicting interests. Since
the late eighteenth century, we do not only observe this longue dure´e of
ideas about the Mediterranean, we also see that the ideas of Europe18
and theMediterranean are intimately and inextricably interwoven. For an
14 GiacomoMarramao,The PassageWest: Philosophy after the Age of the Nation State (London and
New York, 2012), p. 10.
15 Manuel Borutta and Fabian Lemmes, ‘Die Wiederkehr des Mittelmeerraumes: Stand und
Perspektiven der neuhistorischen Mediterranistik’, Neue Politische Literatur, 58/1 (2013), pp. 389–
419, at p. 390.
16 Gregory, ‘Imaginative geographies’, p. 477.
17 Claudio Fogu, ‘From mare nostrum to mare aliorum: Mediterranean theory and Mediterraneism
in contemporary Italian thought’, California Italian Studies Journal, 1/1 (2010), pp. 1–23, at p. 1.
18 Mikael af Malborg and Bo Stra˚th, The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and
Among Nations (Oxford and New York, 2002); Rolf Petri, ‘Europa? Ein Zitatensystem’, Comparativ,
14/3 (2004), pp. 14–49.
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appropriate understanding of these ideas, we cannot refer to variants and
differences alone, but must also consider semantic structures that remain
stable over the period of observation.
This does not mean that similar structures never change. Of course,
the basic underlying assumptions of the Mediterranean metaphor also
have a history. Building on the humanist elaborations of the ﬁfteenth
and sixteenth centuries, over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
they substituted the state of nature for the Garden of Eden and the
teleology of redemption from savagery and barbarism for the theology
of the redemption from sin. The new promise of the heavens consisted
of a progress towards a society capable of deploying a ‘humanity almost
resemblingGod’ and ﬁnally to open the bud that encloses ‘the true formof
mankind’ inherent in its original nature.19 In short, the Christian mission
was translated into a slightly diverse eschatological narrative, which
can be summarized by referring to the eighteenth-century neologism
‘civilization’, although it also took other names. This genealogy leads
some scholars to derive the overall arrangement and political paradigms
of western society ‘from Christian theology’.20 What interest me here are
the ideological consequences of this heredity. AsKarl Lo¨with pointed out,
what characterizes the very core of thewestern philosophy of history is not
so much the question what meaning is attributed to history, but that it is
attributed ameaning at all. It is a purpose or end of history that transcends
the present and explains it in the light of the past and the future, even in
its most secularized and atheistic versions.21 According to John Gray, this
is still the apocalyptic backbone of western thinking today.22
Napoleon, protagonist of the above-mentioned event, condensed the
western pathos of history into one sentence. He knew that from the top
of the pyramids ‘history’ would oversee Frenchmen ﬁghting and dying
for the unity of the Mediterranean under the sign of a ‘civilization’ that
would use this unity to spread ‘true humanity’ over the world. This is why
in the present context I prefer to speak of the Mediterranean metaphor in
the singular form. The virtually inﬁnite ﬂow ofMediterranean metaphors
seems to form a maelstrom around this one, singular idea.
II
During the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, when humanist elaboration
made its ﬁrst steps towards what, in retrospect, we would characterize
as the secularization of eschatology, ‘Christianity’ was, for the ﬁrst
time, geographically located.23 A ‘Christian Europe’ was conceived
19 Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit [1784–91] (Berlin,
1914), p. 53.
20 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and
Government (Stanford, 2011), p. 1.
21 Karl Lo¨with,Meaning in History (Chicago and London, 1949), pp. 4–5, 84.
22 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London, 2008), pp. 7–11.
23 Petri, ‘Europa?’, pp. 19–25.
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to be projected towards the future and unknown exotic spaces, and
retrospectively extended to past times when in fact the thinking of
mundane fines christianitatis was theologically interdicted.24 When the
sense of mission was gradually secularized during the following centuries,
Europe remained the geographical centre for the avant-garde of human
progress. The atheist Enlightenment philosopher Condorcet underlined
that this continent had been assigned the task to plant ‘in Africa and Asia
the principles and example of the freedom, reason, and illumination of
Europe’.25
According to geographer Hans-Dietrich Schultz, the continents of
classical geography were all but derived from describing the naturally
differentiated space partitions of our planet’s surface. They descended
from a previously conceived teleological programme, from which
geography adapted its interpretation of physical conditions. To each of
the continents, this programme assigned a role in the universal ‘relay race
of culture’.26 The author further points out that:
[E]vidently Europe is seen as a naturally grounded ‘object per se’ which just
has to be discovered and named. This approach hides the fact that the object
Europe is depending on time and culture, that in the course of history it
had greatly diverging extensions, and that knowledge about it is no neutral
cognition but a collectively shared attribution of a meaning, which to other
cultures remains senseless.27
The modern reinvention of the Mediterranean as a meaningful unitary
space seems more recent than the ﬁfteenth-century humanist resumption
of ‘Europe’. The Mediterranean metaphor was most likely in the making
since the late seventeenth century, when mainly Venetian, English and
French seafarers, travellers, explorers, merchants and officials shaped a
new Mediterranean geography with their descriptions, reﬂections and
reports to their governments. During the second half of the eighteenth
century, these ‘pioneers’ probably keptGibbon’s lesson inmind, according
to which, after the fall of the western Roman empire, its former territories
and waters were newly traversed by the antique east–west divide, with
Constantinople protecting ‘the wealth of Asia’ and commanding ‘the
important straits which connect the Euxine and Mediterranean seas’.28
On a more comprehensive level, the Mediterranean was probably not
described as a ‘naturally and culturally unitary space’ before the end of
the eighteenth century, when biologists, geologists and climate researchers
24 Franco Cardini, Le radici cristiane dell’Europa: Miti, storia, prospettive (Rimini, 1997), p. 11.
25 Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet, Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the
Human Mind (Philadelphia, 1796), p. 255.
26 Hans-Dietrich Schultz, ‘Die Platzierung der Tu¨rkei: Ein Fall fu¨r denGeographen?’,Geographische
Revue, 9/1–2 (2007), pp. 17–48, at p. 20.
27 Hans-Dietrich Schultz, ‘Halbinseln, Inseln und ein “Mittelmeer”: Su¨deuropa und daru¨ber hinaus
in der klassischen deutschen Geographie’, in idem (ed.),Metropolitanes &Mediterranes: Beitra¨ge aus
der Humangeographie (Berlin, 2006), pp. 129–88, at p. 132.
28 Edward Gibbon, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire’ [1776–89], in Gibbon, History of
Rome: The Works of Edward Gibbon, VI (New York, 1906), p. 292.
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started seeing the similarities of fauna, landscape and climate, while
geographers and cartographers ‘separated theMediterranean fromAfrica
and Asia for being a part of Europe, and archaeologists and historians
depicted it as the cradle of European civilization’.29
In tracing the contours of continents and world-regions, the founders
of classical geography were following Enlightenment traditions. For
example, Voltaire already claimed that ‘three things incessantly inﬂuence
the spirit of men: climate, government and religion’.30 Herder made
the point that ‘seas, mountain chains, and large rivers are the natural
separation lines of lands as well as of peoples, customs, languages,
and kingdoms; even in the greatest revolutions of human affairs they
constituted the directing axes and borders of world history’.31 Since the
late eighteenth century, scholarship has based these holistic concepts on
the distinction of, and interplay between, human historical time and
nature’s timeless presence or circularity. This approach supplanted the
former official geography based on sovereign state boundaries. It brought
to the fore ‘in varying combinations layer and natural boundaries, climate,
history, economy, culture, and politics; this approach was suggestive
of differences between geographical partitions that were extracted from
reality instead of being guided by human purpose’.32 The romanticist
concept of ‘space individual’ and the later pseudo-biologist metaphor
of nations and states as living organisms were variants of, rather than
opposites to, the holistic and teleological concept of late Enlightenment
geography.
Early geopolitics also adhered to the same understanding, since
it pretended to highlight the difference between space-related human
achievements which were in harmony with nature and history, and
those which were not and thus, according to another basic axiom
of western philosophy, lacked legitimacy. The same understanding
also remained common to almost all spatial conceptions of the
Mediterranean throughout the twentieth century. At the beginning of that
century, German geographer Theobald Fischer (1846–1910) maintained
that the Mediterranean was an anthropologically and geographically
distinguishable
part of the earth’s surface characterized by ever-recurring peculiarities
which emphasize its difference or even contrast to each of the conﬁning
continents. These peculiarities are so sharply deﬁned that its separation
from the related continents and its resumption as a geographical space
in its own right is not only possible, but appears necessary for its full
comprehension.33
29 Borutta and Lemmes, ‘Die Wiederkehr’, p. 390.
30 Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations [1756], in Œuvres comple`tes de Voltaire,
XXI (Paris, 1785), p. 243.
31 Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie, p. 14.
32 Schultz, ‘Halbinseln, Inseln’, p. 130.
33 Theobald Fischer, Mittelmeerbilder. Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Kunde der Mittelmeerla¨nder
(Berlin and Leipzig, 1908), p. 32.
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After the Second World War, Fernand Braudel (1902–86) popularized
this vision of ‘a very special climate similar from one end to the other of
the sea, which amalgamates landscapes and ways of life’.34 Conceptually,
these visions leaned on that of earlier French geographers, especially Vidal
de la Blache (1845–1918), who had been ‘sympathetic to Ratzel and his
persistent organicism’.35 Therefore, it seems that this understanding of
the Mediterranean was shaped during the nineteenth century, remained
predominant over the twentieth century, and is still inﬂuential today.
At the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, a proposal for a ‘historical
ecology’ of the Mediterranean was made by Horden and Purcell,
an approach that according to Michael Herzfeld offers ‘novel and
interesting heuristic options’.36 It relies on the ‘frequent invocation of
the natural ecologist’s terms’, paying nevertheless ‘sustained attention to
what is distinctively historical about the place of humanity within the
environment, and particularly to the complexity of human interaction
across large distances’.37 The authors’ concept of Mediterranean space
abandons the traditional ideas of a natural and cultural unity in favour of
a more complex and sophisticated unifying principle, that is connectivity,
seen as a property of structurally similar and similarly changing ‘micro-
ecologies’. The authors claim that:
We can never hope to come to an understanding of what can usefully be
said of the Mediterranean-wide human or physical landscape until we are
fully sensitive to the enormous variety and diversity of environments within
the basin of the sea, not just to the constants that apparently underlie the
chaos.38
Overall, the ‘spatial turn’ in the realm of historiography reinforces
the attention to the social, economic and cultural production of space,
and to historical ecology.39 At the same time, many geographers engage
with a historicizing deconstruction of the conceptual foundations of the
underlying spatial categories. Schultz states that human action needs the
establishment of orders, and that spatial orders are particularly efficient
in this respect. Nevertheless, he also points out that all of these orders,
however detailed and differentiated,
are only abstractions, not images of reality. This makes it spurious asking
whether such spaces are ‘real’ or not. What is at stake here is rather whether
34 Fernand Braudel, ‘Me`re me´diterrane´e’, Le Courrier (UNESCO) 38 (1985), pp. 4–12, at p. 7 (exce-
rpted from La Me´diterrane´e, l’espace et l’histoire (Paris, 1985)).
35 Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge and Oxford, 1994), p. 49. On Vidal’s
inﬂuence on Braudel, see Paolo Giaccaria and Claudio Minca, ‘The Mediterranean alternative’,
Progress in Human Geography, 35/3 (2010), pp. 345–65, at pp. 348–9. See also Paul Vidal de la
Blache, ‘Les grandes agglome´rations humaines. Troisie`me article: Re´gionsMe´diterrane´enes’,Annales
de Ge`ographie, 147 (1918), pp. 147–87.
36 Michael Herzfeld, ‘Practical Mediterraneanism: excuses for everything, from epistemology to
eating’, in William V. Harris (ed.), Rethinking the Mediterranean (Oxford, 2005), pp. 45–63, at p. 50.
37 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean
History (Oxford, 2000), p. 49.
38 Ibid., p. 53.
39 See Angelo Torre, ‘La produzione storica dei luoghi’, Quaderni Storici, 2 (2002), pp. 443–76.
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they do what they are expected to do, and which chances, problems or even
dangers are conveyed by certain conceptions of space, by those who proffer
them, and by those to whom they address.40
In my view, the search for answers to these questions of a geographer
represents an almost archetypal task also for historical inquiry.
III
TheMediterranean is a fact, anthropologist Herzfeld observes, specifying
that ‘factuality itself is always a constitutive act’ and implying that claims
for the Mediterranean to exist ‘do not so much enunciate facts as create
them’.41 If ‘power’ means the ‘ability to act or do’, this certainly holds for
geographical facts, which at least put forward an intention or, at best, its
successful implementation.When a physical portion of space, for example
a sea and its rims, is declared to be a ‘region’, we should remember
that the ‘term region derives from regere fines, that is to govern/mark
out borders’.42 Whenever we look at particular cases of region-building,
these display a complex ‘state of becoming, assembling, connecting up,
centring, and distributing all kind of things’, that ‘brings together various
forms of power, varying from coercive to immanent, from power that
bounds spaces to power that opens them up’.43 On a more general level,
however, it remains the case that any ‘region’ brings power and might to
the fore. This is why the term ‘geopolitics’ can be seen, at least to a certain
extent, as a pleonasm. Classical geography was already geopolitical since
‘every project of regional mapping or region building is nothing but a
political project translated into space(s)’.44
Geopolitics proper, that is, the speciﬁc ﬁeld of investigation of a distinct
academic discipline, developed after 1890, from a triangular liaison
between geography, political sciences and history. The latter remained
more on the background of disciplinary deﬁnitions, but was fundamental,
since the typical geopolitical approach of the time argued with the past
to single out the rules, assessed the present with those rules and, on
this basis, formulated proposals for the future. The founding texts of
geopolitics paid great attention to the sea as a political and strategic
asset and operated a fundamental differentiation between land powers
and sea powers. The United States Navy captain and historian Alfred
Mahan popularized this debate. His ideas were promptly used in political
and military realms (for example, by Kaiser Wilhelm II to legitimize his
Flottenpolitik) and inﬂuenced Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, Karl
40 Schultz, ‘Halbinseln, Inseln’, p. 47.
41 Herzfeld, ‘Practical Mediterraneanism’, p. 50.
42 Luiza Bialasiewicz, Paolo Giaccaria, Alun Jones and Claudio Minca, ‘Re-scaling “EU”rope: EU
macro-regional fantasies in the Mediterranean’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 20 (2013) pp.
59–76.
43 Anssi Paasi, ‘Regions are social constructs, but who or what “constructs” them?’, Environment and
Planning, A/42 (2010), pp. 2296–301, at pp. 2299–300.
44 Bialasiewicz et al., ‘Re-scaling “EU”rope’, p. 71.
C© 2016 The Author. History C© 2016 The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
ROLF PETRI 681
Haushofer, Carl Schmitt and Nicholas Spykman, the most outstanding
scholars of early twentieth century geopolitics, some of whom retain a
certain inﬂuence even among present-day American geopolitical think
tanks. This does not mean that everyone agreed with Mahan. On
the contrary, Mackinder, for example, opposed his idea of the
predominance of sea powers; by affirming the predominance of land
powers, he nevertheless acknowledged the importance of Mahan’s
fundamental distinction.
What interests us here, however, is not the speciﬁc content of the
geopolitical debate, but the question why the Mediterranean within
this debate emerged as the ‘mother of all examples’. To open a
geopolitical treatise with observations regarding Mediterranean history,
for example, on the Roman empire and its ‘maritime control over the
entire shoreline of the Mediterranean Sea’,45 has apparently become
an unbroken tradition for over a century – a tradition that Mahan
inaugurated. In his 1890 book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History,
the author, in an effort to show that in history ‘sea power had a strategic
bearing and weight which has received scant recognition’, started his
demonstration with a Mediterranean example, the Second Punic War.
Notwithstanding a lack of ‘full knowledge necessary for tracing in detail
its inﬂuence’, he was left in no doubt that sea power ‘was a determining
factor’.46
Other seminal texts of geopolitics selected the Mediterranean as an
exemplary case: in Das Meer als Quelle der Vo¨lkergro¨ße, published in
1900 by Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), the Mediterranean even becomes
a speciﬁc analytical category which he distinguishes from the open sea
on the one hand, and closed waters on the other. He detects similar
natural properties for two other ‘Mediterraneans’, the Caribbean and
the Australasian ones. As he saw it, in the future, these other two
Mediterraneans would converge with the geopolitical features of what
he called ‘our Mediterranean’.47 While several authors later adopted
his open sea, middle sea and closed sea taxonomy in other cases, the
description of the Mediterranean as a vanguard of history should be
underlined.
In the same book, the Mediterranean also serves, as in Mahan’s
pioneering work, as the exemplary case, which has the privilege of offering
the ﬁrst demonstration of the thesis that the author puts forward. The
thesis is basically the same as Mahan’s, but here it is not the Phoenicians,
it is, besides Venice, the Greek example that must illustrate it. ‘The war
plan of Pericles – the author writes at a certain point – demonstrates full
awareness of the natural force of a sea power’.48 Moreover, it is again in the
45 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Impera-
tives (New York, 1997), p. 10.
46 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston, 1890), p. 14.
47 Friedrich Ratzel, Das Meer als Quelle der Vo¨lkergro¨ße: Eine politisch-geographische
Studie (Munich and Leipzig, 1900), pp. 19–25.
48 Ratzel, Das Meer als Quelle, p. 59.
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Mediterranean, again inGreece, whereMackinder, in his 1919 publication
Democratic Ideals and Reality, ﬁres back at sea power supremacy. He
selects the same geographical example, but he does it to demonstrate the
exact reverse: ‘No Greek of full blood but looked upon a Macedonian
as a sort of bastard! But his position in the broad root of the Greek
peninsula enabled the Macedonian to conquer the Greek sea-base’.49
For Mackinder, the Mediterranean was not necessarily a springboard
for worldwide expansion. On the contrary, before the Suez channel was
inaugurated its waterways detached Europe from the Indian and Paciﬁc
Oceans. The Mediterranean rather resembled the southern moat of the
European fortress, or part of a ‘natural provision for the intimacy of a
family of nations’.50
As we have seen, Ratzel, Mahan and Mackinder arrived at
contradictory conclusions regarding the importance of the maritime
space for the development of military force and political power. Does
it make sense, then, to refer their work to a common Mediterranean
metaphor? It does, in so far as ‘the Mediterranean’ represents a complex
of meanings that embraces different and sometimes contradictory single
metaphors, allegories and parables that nevertheless all rotate around
the same idea of ‘history’ and ‘civilization’. Accordingly, for the above-
quoted authors, Mediterranean antiquity served as a model case for
their geopolitical deductions regarding land and sea power, and other
questions, of their own present and future. It was the place ‘where it
all began’, whether ‘civilization’ used the maritime space to gather its
forces necessary for moving another step in the predetermined direction
of historical fulﬁlment, or used it on the contrary as a moat to secure a
ﬂank of its continental or Atlantic development. Consequently, it was up
to Pericles’ ﬂeet on the one hand, to Alexander’s land army on the other,
to deliver a parable for the principle that, according to the authors, had
been proven right time and ever again. No other place in the world seemed
to possess the same persuasive authority to stage such a universally
valid demonstration. All scholars of geopolitics agreed that it was the
birthplace, both of Greek and Roman antiquity and of ‘the Christian
community as a universal system’,51 to use Rudolf Kjelle´n’s expression.
Similarly, Fischer spoke of ‘an area of Mediterranean culture where the
origins of our European culture lie and which consist of Christianity and
classical erudition. Since the 19th century they have become an oceanic,
and even a world, culture.’52
49 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruc-
tion (New York, 1919), p. 61.
50 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, p. 62; for older views on the Mediterranean as a barrier, see
Matthew D’Auria, ‘Protean boundaries: Montesquieu’s Europe and the Mediterranean world’,
French History, 29/1 (2015) pp. 31–45.
51 Rodolf Kjelle´n, ‘What inspires a League of Nations’, The Living Age, 17 (1920), pp. 137–9, at p.
138.
52 Fischer,Mittelmeerbilder, p . 1.
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IV
Hence, at the time when geopolitics ‘proper’ took its ﬁrst steps, the
Mediterranean had deﬁnitely become the name for the place ‘where it all
began’. It may be worth taking a closer look at the historical value that the
authors attributed to this geographical partition. If Ratzel’s references to
history in his 1900 treatise were apparently more ‘technical’, in his lecture
manuscript fragments conserved at the Leipzig Archiv fu¨r Geographie,
he reveals a more explicit teleological view. He discussed the role of the
Mediterranean in a lecture on political ethnography under the title ‘The
Oriental Question’. Apparently, the Leipzig professor drafted and revised
the related notes between 1895 and 1903. Ratzel states: ‘Because the
culture of Central Asia expanded to theWest through theMediterranean,
the Mediterranean countries acquired earlier a position of historical
importance than those of Northern Europe. This is why they until today
conserve their characteristics of an old historical age.’53 Similarly, one
of Fischer’s statements, ‘While the Mediterranean as a focus of culture
had few connections to Africa either as a donor or as a beneﬁciary,
to Europe it has almost exclusively given, from Asia almost exclusively
taken’,54 the passage in Ratzel’s text fragment situates the Mediterranean
within what Schultz characterizes as a culture teleology. We should
keep in mind here that Kultur was at the time the German pseudo-
opposite and de facto synonym to the French concept of civilisation.
As the concept of Kulturstufen signals, German scholars saw history
likewise as a progression from lower to higher stages, almost in the same
way suggested by the concept of civilization. That the more or less
convincing differences discussed by Kant, von Humboldt, Nietzsche and
others were in the late nineteenth century translated into a unbridgeable
opposition,55 and civilisation supplanted by Kulturentwicklung as the core
process of history, apparently hadmore to dowith refuting the intellectual
primate of the ‘French enemy’ than with other reasons.
Of course, there were national differences regarding details that were
of great political, but little conceptual, relevance. Each nation legitimized
its existence with a particularly central part in Europe’s universal mission
and shaped the related Mediterranean images in its own way. In 1876, a
French geographer, E´lise´e Reclus, wrote:
The march of civilization has long operated in the direction of southeast
to northwest: Phoenicia, Greece, Italy, France, were successively the
great homes of human intelligence. The main reason for this historical
phenomenon is found in the same conﬁguration of the sea that served
as a vehicle for people on the move; the axis of civilization, so to speak,
53 Archiv fu¨r Geographie (AfG), Leipniz-Institut fu¨r La¨nderkunde, Leipzig; Nachlass Ratzel, box
155, shelfmark 348, Die orientalische Frage, fo. 23.
54 Fischer,Mittelmeerbilder, p . 1.
55 See Pietro Rossi, ‘Civilta`’, Enciclopedia delle scienze sociali, I (Roma, 1991), pp. 793–808, at
pp. 800–2.
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superposed the central axis of the Mediterranean waters from Syria to the
Gulf of Lion.56
It is difficult to imagine that an Italian or a German geographer, let
us assume an anarchist one as Reclus was, would have used a similar
wording. If they shared the same vision of history, one that is capable
of inventing metaphors such as ‘human intelligence on the move’, they
would have at least slightly ‘corrected’ civilization’s geographical itinerary
according to their own national traditions. What interests us here is
not such national or personal variants of the same narration, but the
coinciding origins of Europe and the Mediterranean which it always
contained, depicting both as products of an original transmission of
culture or civilization from the east to the west. The degree of culture
deﬁnes the ‘historical importance’ of a place, that is, how far or close
‘this place’ is to the teleological fulﬁlment of history. Northern Europe
now stands higher in this hierarchy, argued Ratzel, but theMediterranean
conserves the dignity of an old respectable age. It also conserves the
footprints and ambiguities of the original encounter between the west
and the east: a geographical ‘ﬁnding’ that sounds much like a popular
commonplace, but is a commonplace because it is insistently repeated by
the western master narrative of history.
In the same lecture manuscript, Ratzel explains to his students that
‘the Mediterranean’s central geographical position between Europe, Asia
and Africa transformed it, since the dawn of Antiquity and up to our
days, into an arena where the west-eastern contrasts . . . are disputed
and compensated’. After some additional wording inserted later, the
phrase went: ‘an arena where the west-eastern contacts are established and
contrasts . . . disputed and compensated’.57 His later insertion appears
to reﬂect the back and forth in western descriptions of places where
civilizations are supposed to ‘hybridize’ and/or clash. Within this range
of possibilities, both cooperative and conﬂicting, political strategies
can thus be conﬁdent of ﬁnding experts who explain the scientiﬁcally
unquestionable, geographical and historical, necessities of either peace or
war.
What Schultz means by the adaptation of the planet’s surface to the
needs of a teleological narrative can also be seen when we consider
‘the Mediterranean’s central geographical position between Europe, Asia
and Africa’ asserted by Ratzel. For the author the latter centrality is
visibly not a question of changeable perspectives according to variable
parameters, which would make of centre and periphery categories that
are more ephemeral. Rather, it is a geographical property carved in stone,
i.e. geological formations, and determined by land masses, waters and
climate. One may ask why, if physical properties determine centrality,
56 E´lise´e Reclus, Nouvelle ge´ographie universelle, I (Paris, 1876), p. 47.
57 AfG, Nachlass Ratzel, box 155, shelfmark 348, Die orientalische Frage, folio 20; inserted words
highlighted.
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the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Caribbean Sea,
Lake Michigan, or any other ‘middle seas’ or water masses encircled, or
almost encircled, by land masses, were considered less ‘central’ than the
Mediterranean. The most likely answer is that, in theMediterranean case,
the surrounding lands were divided into continents and labelled Europe,
Asia and Africa according to their hierarchical position in teleology.
V
As early as 1845, a liberal Austrian leader, Franz Schuselka (1811–86),
wrote a book on the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the North Seas. He
stated that: ‘The World Spirit strives to lift the magic ban under the
spell of which the Mediterranean countries have been lying in chains for
centuries now. Should the antiquated and obsolete world really rejuvenate,
it will necessarily be in the same place where humanity lived its most
beautiful and vigorous youth.’58 This was a rather patheticHegelian vision
of the Mediterranean’s historical and geographical fate. It nevertheless
represented one of the roots of Ratzel’s political geography. Moreover,
it included a concept of the state as a historical subject, which would
be central to future geopolitical approaches. As Schuselka noted, ‘in the
Mediterranean statecraft in all its variants and degrees faces its most
magniﬁcent challenges’.59
It is certainly true that the nation-state’s role was further exalted by
Ratzel’s and others’ reference to Haeckel’s and Darwin’s evolutionist
theories. They pretended to apply them by interpreting states and nations
as living organisms, which more or less successfully deal with the purpose
of history. As I see it, the trick is not so much in the use of organic
metaphors than in their teleological interpretation, as teleology, if not
lacking at all, is a quite intricate and disputed aspect of evolutionary
biological theories.60 Therefore, pseudo-biological interpretations were
not the decisive trait of political geography, but represented just one of
the branches that, over time, were grafted onto the teleological trunk of
western philosophy of history. As we have seen, Schuselka, in his vulgar-
Hegelian version, did not need biology to make the state the principal
agent for the fulﬁlment of history.
The concept of ‘geopolitics’ was famously ﬁrst used by the Swedish
political scientist Rudolf Kjelle´n (1864–1922), in his 1899 Introduction to
the Geography of Sweden. Inﬂuenced by Ratzel’s political geography, he
deﬁned geopolitics as an analysis of the impact that geographic factors
have on international relations.61 With the state seen as the principle
subject of history, his concern was for ‘the relationship between the
58 Franz Schuselka,Mittelmeer, Ost- und Nordsee (Leipzig, 1845), p. 195.
59 Schuselka,Mittelmeer, p. 205.
60 See the dispute in Biology and Philosophy between James G. Lennox, ‘Darwin was a teleologist’,
8/4 (1993), pp. 409–21, and Michael T. Ghiselin, ‘Darwin’s language may seem teleological, but his
thinking is another matter’, 9/4 (1994), pp. 489–92.
61 See Bertil Ha¨ggman, ‘Rudolf Kjelle´n’, Nationalencyklopedin, XI (Ho¨gana¨s, 1993), p. 67.
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anatomy of power and its geographical foundation’.62 Relying on both
Ratzel and Kjelle´n, the political scientist Karl Haushofer (1869–1946)
would later claim that geopolitics determines ‘which transformations
are only apparently due to mere cultural and power motivations, but
actually depend on geographically determined causes, and which others
instead depend only on human will, which asserts itself independently
of environmental and physiographical factors or even against them’.63
Regarding the German school of geopolitics and its connection with the
Nazi movement a long debate has developed in reaction to post-1989
attempts of rehabilitation.64 Several authors, while polemical towards the
‘German school’, accredit the scientiﬁc value of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ one;65
others conclude that some scholars exaggerate the differences in order to
protect newly booming international geopolitics from blame.66
In fact, the renewed interest in geopolitics during the late twentieth
century was not conﬁned to neo-conservative ‘think tanks’ and ‘realist’
or ‘liberal’ scholars of international relations who apparently relied on
Mackinder and other early traditions. Among political geographers,
a branch of ‘critical geopolitics’ developed, the promoters of which
deﬁned geopolitics ‘as a discursive practice by which intellectuals
of statecraft “spatialize” international politics’,67 placing themselves
‘within the post-modern debate concerning territory, boundaries and
sovereignty’.68 Gearo´id O´ Tuathail, a leading ﬁgure of this branch of
geopolitical research, underlined that the earlier geopolitical writers,
albeit coming ‘from quite different national backgrounds’, made it
possible with their writings ‘to retroactively invent a geopolitical tradition
with Mackinder and Ratzel as its “founding fathers” ’. They were not
only all ‘invariably imperialists of one sort or another’, they also had
in common ‘a philosophical approach to reality grounded in Cartesian
perspectivalism’.69 They likewise accepted, I would add, the basic axioms
of the western philosophy of history, and shared on these grounds a
62 Silviu Costachie, ‘German school of geopolitics: evolution, ideas, prospects’, Revista Romaˆnӑ de
Geografie Politicӑ, 8/2 (2011), pp. 264–76, at p. 274.
63 Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans: Studien u¨ber die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen
Geographie und Geschichte (Berlin, 1924), p. 4.
64 See Frank Ebeling, Geopolitik: Karl Haushofer und seine Raumwissenschaft 1919–1945 (Berlin,
1994); contra: Werner Ko¨ster, ‘Der “Raum” als Kategorie der Resubstantialisierung: Analysen zur
neuerlichen Konjunktur einer deutschen Semantik’, in Robert Stockhammer (ed.), TopoGraphien
der Moderne. Medien zur Repra¨sentation und Konstruktion von Ra¨umen (Munich, 2005), pp. 25–71,
at p. 48.
65 Nils Hoffmann, Renaissance der Geopolitik? Die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Kalten
Krieg (Wiesbaden, 2012), p. 34.
66 Wiebeke Bo¨ge, Die Einteilung der Erde in Großra¨ume: Zum Weltbild der deutschsprachigen
Geographie seit 1871 (Hamburg, 1997), pp. 160–4.
67 Gearo´id O´ Tuathail and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning
in American foreign policy’, Political Geography, 11/2 (1992), pp. 190–204, at p. 190.
68 David Newman, ‘Geopolitics renaissant: territory, sovereignty and the world political map’, in
David Newman (ed.), Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity (London, 1999), pp. 1–16, at p. 1.
69 Gearo´id O´ Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London, 1996),
pp. 22–3.
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similar vision of theMediterranean, even if the details of that vision varied
according to their different national and personal backgrounds.
This holds, for example, for the Swede Kjelle´n who, in his 1905 work
Stormakterna deﬁnes the Mediterranean as a European sea, although
he does it from a northern European perspective. He shares Schuselka’s
view on the Mediterranean’s relapse into lethargy but seems not to
believe that it could easily recover and become again a driving force
behind universal political change. Instead, he characterizes the Strait
of Gibraltar as the European access point ‘to both the small and great
Orients’.70 His formulation not only conﬁrms Ratzel’s mixed contact and
conﬂict zone theory; it also underlines that ‘the classical Mediterranean
is no longer in the foreground of history’71 and that consequently the
‘historical importance’ of Europe has shifted away from its ambiguous
Mediterranean origins, towards the Atlantic rims of the continent. It
means that from a more ‘true’ European viewpoint, which by deﬁnition
is always the most ‘modern’ or ‘advanced’ one, the Mediterranean has
to be accessed through the Atlantic Ocean, besides of course France and
Spain which have both options, and Italy, which Kjelle´n sees relegated to
a merely ‘internal’ position.72
In the descriptions of the time, however, the Strait of Gibraltar is not
only a way in; it is also a way out. This holds, at least, for the age of Philip
II, as for example Fischer underlines in his 1908 book:
around the time which we usually refer to as the early modern period of
history, seafarers who acquired their skills in the Mediterranean instruct
the European peoples living on the ocean’s rim and extend the space of
action of the Mediterranean culture to the whole of Europe. By doing so,
they create the conditions for European dominance over a world already
made wider by Italians.73
The same line of reasoning is taken up by German historian Paul
Herre (1876–1962), in his work on The Fight for Dominance in the
Mediterranean published in 1909. He underlines the decisive contribution
ofMediterranean knowledge and experience in seafaring, itsmariners and
naval technology, to European overseas expansion:
The people of the Mediterranean offered a groundbreaking contribution
to the formidable effort to exploit the world. They did this even though it
moved their own space away from the focus of historical life. Obeying an
instinctive impulse, these people put the achievements of their sea area at
the disposal of universal human progress. This is a particularly strong and
clear proof for the intrinsic force of history . . . 74
70 Rudolf Kjelle´n, Stormakterna: konturer kring samtidens storpolitik (Stockholm, [1905]
1912), p. 22.
71 Ibid., p. 85.
72 Ibid., p. 41.
73 Fischer:Mittelmeerbilder, p. 12.
74 Paul Herre, Der Kampf um die Herrschaft im Mittelmeer (Leipzig, 1909), p. 77.
C© 2016 The Author. History C© 2016 The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
688 THEMEDITERRANEANMETAPHOR
VI
As Paolo Giaccaria and Claudio Minca remind us, the inﬂuence ‘of
French geography (in particular, the work of Paul Vidal de la Blache and
Lucien Febvre) is explicitly laid out by Braudel in the opening pages of
his opus magnum on the Mediterranean’.75 Thomas Schippers has even
drawn a link between the German geographers of the early nineteenth
century, such as Karl Ritter and Alexander von Humboldt, and later
French geographers, such as Elise´e Reclus (a student of Ritter’s), ‘and
even later historians like Fernand Braudel, for whom various degrees of
cultural “continuity” and similarity existed among peoples living around
the interior sea although they refused any form of (over)-simplifying
Ratzelian determinism’.76 If these scholars are right, we may conclude
that, despite the undoubted originality of Braudel’s corpus of historical
investigation, earlier historians as well as geographical and geopolitical
writers anticipated important conceptual traits of his Me´diterrane´e. We
have also seen that this commonality was not limited to the alleged socio-
anthropological peculiarities of the ‘Mediterranean peoples’, but likewise
regarded ‘civilization’ as a world-historical process. For example, Herre’s
emphatic underlining of the Mediterranean’s ‘instinctive’ projection
towards the oceans of the entire world anticipated Braudel’s idea of
une plus grande Me´diterrane´e, where Christopher Columbus and others
play the role of Mediterranean torch-bearers of Europe’s universal
mission.77
This is why Amir Husain, who in 1508 led the Egyptian sea expedition
to India, was a less suitable candidate for Mediterranean torch-bearing
in the world, although Braudel inserts Islam among the ‘three cultural
communities, three huge and perennial civilizations, three cardinal
ways of thinking, believing, eating, drinking, living’ which ‘make’ the
Mediterranean.78 What comes to the fore here is not only the world-
historical role assigned to Europe, but also the European role within the
Mediterranean area and its behaviour towards theMediterranean ‘other’.
One has to acknowledge Braudel’s effort to be inclusive, but also that a
hierarchically ordered inclusivity was not alien to French national and
colonial interests.79 Braudel, whose Mediterranean vision had ‘received a
decisive imprint during his Algerian sojourn of almost ten years’, accepted
the thesis of earlier writers that ‘the Arab conquest of North Africa
represented the decisive breach of the originally “Latin” Mediterranean
unity’.80 However, he turned this breach into a claim for inclusivity, which,
75 Giaccaria and Minca, ‘The Mediterranean alternative’, p. 349.
76 Thomas K. Schippers, ‘Nice to think, hard to ﬁnd’, in Dionigi Albera, Anton Blok and Christian
Bromberger (eds), L’anthropologie de la Me´diterrane´e (Paris, 2001), pp. 725–9, at p. 725.
77 Braudel, La Me´diterrane´e, I, p. 155; idem, ‘Me`re me´diterrane´e’, p. 10.
78 Braudel, ‘Me`re me´diterrane´e’, p. 11.
79 John Strachan, ‘The colonial cosmology of Fernand Braudel’, inMartin Thomas (ed.),The French
Colonial Mind, I (Lincoln, NE, 2011), pp. 72–95.
80 Jan Jansen, ‘Die Erﬁndung des Mittelmeerraums im kolonialen Kontext’, in Schenk and Winkler
(eds), Der Su¨den, pp. 175–205, at pp. 177, 203.
C© 2016 The Author. History C© 2016 The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
ROLF PETRI 689
at the time, was functional to the colonial project, at least as long as
teleology legitimized its hierarchal structure.
Earlier German writers, who underlined the same breach but looked
at the Mediterranean from a diverse perspective, had come to a different
conclusion. According to Fischer, ‘the conﬂict between Christianity and
Islam stretches out over the whole of the Mediterranean area like an
electric tension’. Arabs and Turks, the driving forces behind the alien
‘ﬂooding’ of the Mediterranean rims, never became truly Mediterranean
since ‘these originally pastoral tribes and inhabitants of the steppe, while
still dwelling in the driest zones of the Mediterranean, remain inland-
oriented and sea-phobic’. Fischer concluded that ‘to the life and cultural
development of the confessors of Islam who live in the Mediterranean
area the sea is irrelevant’.81 Stereotypic assertions such as these may be
referred to as the exclusivist standpoint.
A third version was offered half a century before Fischer and one
century before Braudel by the Austrian Schuselka, who differentiated
between the earlier ‘revolutionary’ Islam put forward by the
‘imaginative Arabs’ against a spiritually decaying Christianity, and
the institutionalized later Islam, ‘the symbol of honour of which became
the horse tail of the dull Turks’.82 This was, so to say, the half-inclusive and
half-exclusive version of Mediterranean-ness, interested in establishing
a sense of Mediterranean commonality between the Europeans and
those who were ‘oppressed’ by the Ottoman empire, which the European
powers were eager to dismantle. Later also the Turkish nation-state
was most of the time excluded (or spared) from la Me´diterrane´e, more
than the Arab countries which at least could ‘enjoy’ a certain degree of
subaltern inclusion.83
That the Mediterranean had been ‘originally’ united under ‘Latin’,
that is ‘European’, rule, formed a common ground of belief among
all authors, whereas the consequences that were to be drawn from
this ‘historical fact’ differed according to diverging scholarly interests,
political projects and contingency. Depending on time, place and context
the solutions oscillated between inclusive and exclusive versions, and
various mediations between these two extremes. Still, in present political
discourses on the Mediterranean, it is not difficult to ﬁnd elements that
resemble past hierarchies and oscillate within a similar range of inclusion
and exclusion. In 2014–15, for example, political leaders hypothesized a
newwesternmilitarymission into Libya.84 Some of these policy promoters
took into consideration ‘a real military presence the direction of which
81 Fischer,Mittelmeerbilder, pp. 405, 407–8.
82 Schuselka,Mittelmeer, p. 200–1.
83 Edhem Eldem, Feride C¸ic¸ekog˘lu, La Me´diterrane´e turque (Paris, 2000), p. 16.
84 Ian Traynor, ‘EU draws up plans for military attacks on Libya targets to stop migrant
boats’, The Guardian, 10 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/eu-considers-
military-attacks-on-targets-in-libya-to-stop-migrant-boats [accessed 28 Aug. 2015].
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could, or actually should, be Italian’.85 The recommendation expressed
by the second modal verb, however practically motivated, is underpinned
by a long discursive tradition.
In the 1870s, Bohemian writer Eduard Ru¨ffer (1835–78), who in
1860 had served with Garibaldi’s volunteer troops who conquered the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, noted that England was already in almost
complete possession of Egypt. He called on Spain not to lose time
but ‘accept its cultural mission on Africa’s north-western coast, because
should it miss prompt intervention in Morocco, another power will
exploit the opportunity of taking possession of this area destined for
a splendid future, and open it to the blessings of civilization’. Italy, he
meant, would better leave alone Alger and Tunis, which were well off in
French hands. ‘An Italian expansion to the African coastland, however,
where it is imperative to gradually extinguish or civilize the half-savage
Mohammedan tribes, would certainly be an honourable assignment for
the young kingdom’.86
Whenever heirs of the Roman empire come to North Africa, it is, so it
seems, a homecoming. As early as 1811 the reader of another book could
learn that ‘theMediterranean Sea, like the Baltic Sea, are the inner spaces
of European cultural life, and at least a part of the North African coast
has to be considered Europe from a physical and ethnographical point of
view. Africa in its proper meaning lies beyond the Saharan desert.’87 It
was neither a historian nor a geographer who wrote these words, but the
philosopher Karl Friedrich Krause. This was for good reason, because
deﬁning European and Mediterranean borders, which in Krause’s view
perfectly superpose each other in the south, is ultimately a philosophical
question.
VII
Thomas Schippers has argued that through the ‘perspective elaborated
by human geographers and historians of the early twentieth century,
the Mediterranean has become a metaphor of a particular form of
“civilisation” ’.88 As I tried to show in the present article, the metaphor
extended also to the concept of civilization in its more general, i.e.
teleological and world-historical, meaning. These writers operated the
extension by assigning to the Mediterranean a crucial place in history,
not only as the cradle of a ‘European civilization’ that descends from the
encounter with earlier ‘civilizations’, but also as the trigger of ‘modernity’.
85 ‘Libia, Latorre (PD): subito missione onu a guida italiana’, askanews, 4 June 2014, http://www.
askanews.it/esteri/libia-latorre-pd-subito-missione-onu-a-guida-italiana_711450029.htm [accessed
31 Aug. 2015].
86 Eduard Ru¨ffer,DasMittelmeer und seine Seestrategie: Aus demNachlass des Verstorbenen (Prague,
1879), pp. 71, 75–8.
87 Karl Friedrich Krause, Aphorismen zur geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erdkunde (Berlin, [1811]
1894), p. 23, quoted from Schultz, ‘Halbinseln, Inseln’, p. 171.
88 Schippers, ‘Nice to think’, p. 725.
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Through the description of civilization on themove across theMiddle Sea,
from the eastern to the western spaces, from Asia to Europe; through the
assumption that these moves correspond to a progression from ‘lower’ to
‘higher’ historical importance; and, ﬁnally, through the ‘passage to the
west’ by the conquest of the oceans and a ‘new world’, this particular
‘civilization’ showed itself to be the selected one that would leave behind
all geographical limitations to become ‘universal’.
Classical geographers in general, and authors of early geopolitical
writings in particular, as well as many historians of their time, tried to
show what geography contributed to Mediterranean and world history.
What they actually did show was how philosophical assumptions about
history shaped Mediterranean geography. Their texts suggest that the
Mediterranean metaphor’s core paradigm remained stable over time.
They give us an idea of how the most frequent commonplaces of
the western philosophy of history delivered the raw materials for the
making of political geography and early geopolitics. The centrality of the
Mediterranean, which the authors unanimously stated, meant centrality
in the historical narrative. It was not about climate, waters and rims, it was
about meaning in history.
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